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ABSTRACT 
The Brazilian Judiciary is well-known for its inefficiency and delay. Yet, such conclusions are often based 
on anecdotal evidence. Little effort has been made to objectively measure the efficiency in Brazilian 
courts. Studies that combine quantitative and qualitative analysis are even harder to find. This paper uses 
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to measure the efficiency of State Courts in Brazil in the year of 2008. 
Results show that relative efficiency varies substantially across different Courts. Moreover, the typical 
usual criticisms which blame judicial inefficiency on a lack of material and human resources are not 
supported. Instead, efficiency in courts seems to be related to the organizational climate, staff motivation, 
and management quality. 




O  Judiciário  brasileiro  é  conhecido  por  sua  ineficiência  e  morosidade.  Entretanto,  tais  conclusões 
baseiam-se  em  grande  parte  em  evidências  anedóticas.  Poucos  esforços  foram  feitos  para  medir-se 
objetivamente  a  eficiência  nas  cortes  brasileiras.  Estudos  que  combinam  análises  qualitativas  e 
quantitativas são ainda mais raros de se encontrar. Este artigo usa a Análise Envoltória de Dados (DEA) 
para medir a eficiência na Justiça Estadual do Brasil, no ano de 2008. Os resultados indicam que a 
eficiência relativa varia significativamente entre os diferentes estados. Além disso, as usuais críticas que 
apontam para a falta de recursos humanos e materiais como sendo a principal causa de ineficiência nos 
tribunais  não  é  corroborada.  Por  outro  lado,  a  eficiência  nas  cortes  parece  ser  relacionada  ao  clima 
organizacional, à motivação dos funcionários e à qualidade da gestão dos líderes.  
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1. Introduction 
    Since the beginning of the 20
th century, the Brazilian Judiciary has been considered as in a state 
of crisis.  Early in the 1930s, inefficiency in the Federal Courts led to the end of Federal Justice in the 
country. More recently, the declaration of the new Constitution, in 1988, placed a sudden and gigantic 
burden  on  the  courts.  After  20  years  of  a  strict  military  dictatorship,  the  country  was  craving  for 
democracy, and the Constituents materialized this wish by drafting a socially and politically ambitious 
Constitution. It contains dozens, if not hundreds, of fundamental rights, private and collective in nature 
(Cintra, Grinover & Dinamarco 2008; Moreira 2004). Moreover, several new procedural instruments 
were created, which made it relatively easy for many agents to initiate lawsuits against the government 
(Ballard 1999). Some warned that these measures could mess up with the judicial system in the country, 
especially the higher courts (Rosenn 1998). This seems exactly what happened. Since that time, the state 
of the Judiciary has continued to deteriorate, as the privatization of several big public enterprises, the 
establishment of political democracy, and the implementation of many inadequate policies by the central 
government have led to thousands and thousands of lawsuits from citizens. From 1988 to 1996, the 
number of judicial deposits in Brazilian courts had a tenfold increase (Dakolias 1999). Courts clearly 
have not been able to respond to all these demands.  
    That courts in Brazil are inefficient and slow is a well-understood and oft-stated fact. The 
crucial questions are: “Why?” and “How bad are they?”  Several attempts have been made to answer the 
first question; very little has been done to respond to the second.  Most of the time, the discussion is based 
on anecdotal evidence and restricted to judicial circles. Due to the complete absence of quantitative 
courses in most Brazilian law schools, this means that quantitative research has rarely been carried out. 
On  the  other  hand,  researchers  from  other  fields,  such  as  economics,  have  shown  little  interest  in 
analyzing judicial matters in depth. As a result, little progress has been made in the study of judicial 
function. Not surprisingly, proposals for judicial reform – most of them based on conventional wisdom – 
have produced very little concrete impacts year after year. 
    This  paper  has  two  main  objectives.  First,  we  offer  an  economic  analysis  of  the  Brazilian 
Judiciary. We will provide a brief overview of the current situation of Brazilian courts, and discuss some 
of the elements most commonly identified as reasons for the judicial crisis. Yet, our economic analysis 
differs  from  conventional  legal  studies.  For  an  economist,  courts  may  be  viewed  as  organizations, 
analogous to firms. Based on this method, our analysis shows that management, leadership, incentives, 
and organizational climate may play crucial roles in determining the level of court efficiency.  
    The second objective of this paper is to objectively measure court efficiency in Brazil. We 
employ Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to analyze data of year 2008. Our results show that relative 
efficiency  varies  substantially  across  the  states.  In  contrast  to  conventional  wisdom,  courts  are  not 
“equally bad” in the country: some of them are performing much more efficiently relatively to others. 
    We then offer some preliminary evidence of the correlation between efficiency and quality of 
internal management and organization of courts. Finally, we point to some directions for promising future 
research in this topic.   
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2. Overview and Diagnosis of the Current Situation 
    In general, one can affirm that Brazilian Judiciary has a very poor track record. The duration of 
an ordinary process is estimated to be around 1,000 to 1,500 days, although officials affirm that for the 
Supreme Court (STF), an average process takes 14 years to be completed (Fuck, 2008). This is even more 
astonishing if one takes into consideration that the 11 Justices at the STF decided more than 130,000 
cases in the year of 2008, and 150,000 in 2007. This heavy workload is not particular to the Supreme 
Court: any judge in Brazil is, on average, responsible for 10,000 cases at any moment in time (Sherwood, 
2007). The rate of appeals is also high. The World Bank (2004) estimated that, between 1993 and 2003, 
the ratio of cases judged in the second-degree courts and those judged in the first-degree courts varied 
from 0.5 (in the last year of the survey) to 1.0 (in 1999 and 2000). However, these numbers do not 
indicate whether the level of appeals is uniformly high across all cases, or whether some cases generate 
multiple appeals.  
    Judicial demand is not equally distributed across different courts. A survey carried out by the 
Ministry of Justice in 2007 indicated that State Justice Courts account for 73% of all judicial services in 
the country. From 1990 to 2002, filings and adjudications in first-degree State Courts increased threefold, 
while appeals in second-degree courts increased sixfold (World Bank, 2004). 
    Inefficiency in Brazilian courts is usually credited to two factors: shortage of material and 
human resources (e.g., Rebelo 2003), and poor quality of procedural law (e.g., Sherwood 2007; Moreira 
2004; Hammergren 2002; Dakolias 1999; Rosenn 1998; Machado 2005; Machado 1997). Let us take a 
deeper analysis of both arguments. 
Factor 1: Shortage of Material Resources 
    Judiciary staff members are the most frequent critics of the lack of resources; they argue that 
human and material resources at all levels are insufficient to deal with the large number of cases. In recent 
years, the concern with the apparent underuse of information technology has also increased. Creating a 
modern electronic infrastructure and digital files have become a “frisson” in the courts. 
    Yet, the analysis is quite different when one considers the opinions of legal scholars and experts 
who  are  not  daily  involved  with  operations  in  the  courts. According  to  them,  the  lack  of  resources, 
including information technology, is not the main problem. Specifically with regards to the shortage of 
judges, Maria Dakolias, an expert on judicial systems at the World Bank, affirms: 
“The number of judges is always a delicate topic for reformers, because hiring more judges is often 
a favorite solution for problems of inefficiency. Lack of judges has historically been cited as the 
main reason for delay. This perception, however, relates primarily to those courts that are not well-
managed … This is not to say that in some cases there is not a need for additional judges, but 
additional research is needed to justify the increase, as increasing the number of judges may not 
always solve the problem” (1999, p. 20, emphasis by the author).  
 
Interestingly, some high ranked judges also support this opinion. Justice Gilmar Mendes, when taking 
office  as  President  of  the  Supreme  Court  in  May  2008,  expressed  much  concern  about  judicial  
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inefficiency and slackness, but took a different approach to the problem: “The Judiciary is being challenged 
to  contribute  to  the  effort  of  resource  rationalization,  without  necessarily  expanding  the  existing  [material] 
structures. Thus, the emphasis should be on the optimization of already available means”. His predecessor on the 
STF Presidency, Justice Ellen Gracie, has the same opinion: “The challenge of the Judiciary is to restructure 
itself. It is useless to only increase the amount of judges and courts. In the long run, this will not work”
1. Both the 
current  and  the  ex  Presidents  of  the  Supreme  Court  believe  that  the  best  way  to  increase  judicial 
efficiency is to use resources wisely, in other words, to improve management of resources.  
Factor 2: Bad Quality of Procedural Law 
    Brazil inherited a highly bureaucratic procedural law from the Portuguese and the civil law 
traditions. This is one of the primary reasons for current court inefficiency. Slackness, a complex system 
of procedural rules, and an overemphasis on format are traces still present in today’s law. In addition to 
that, one central criticism is to the ease of appealing to judicial decisions. The large number of appeals is 
considered  to  be  unavoidable  by  some  lawyers,  because  they  say  it  minimizes  trial  errors. Yet,  this 
conclusion is not supported by the data.  Rosenn (1998) shows that 90% of all decisions made in first 
instance courts is maintained by judges in the appellate courts. In other words, the high level of appeals 
simply means more useless work, more slackness, and more wasted resources.  
    Moreover, at each stage of the system, work is done in a very ineffective manner. A survey 
carried out by the Instituto Nacional de Qualidade Judicial (in Sherwood, 2007) shows that cases in courts 
spend a great amount of the time simply “waiting in line”. It takes, on average, three years for a case to go 
through a first-degree court. Yet, it takes no longer than six aggregate hours for a judge to analyze it. All 
the remaining time is used for waiting or moving through different bureaucratic stages within the court.  
    Do the lack and waste of resources, bureaucracy, and bad quality of procedural law in Brazil tell 
the whole story? To a casual observer, they do; yet, there is more than reveals a superficial analysis.  
    First, since an average process takes years to be concluded, only parties with plenty of financial 
resources, or with strong financial interests at stake, can afford the full costs of a lengthy judicial process. 
In general, these are parties associated with one of three following categories: the State, big creditors, and 
big  debtors.  The  great  majority  of  judicial  cases  in  Brazilian  courts  is  brought  by  companies  and 
individuals who have money to receive from the State. In other words, the most frequent debtor in the 
courts is the State; and, by far, the largest debtor in the country is the National Pension System (Instituto 
Nacional de Previdência Social – INPS). Not only the State is the most frequent user of the Judiciary, it is 
also a bad user: it always appeals, even when it knows that there is no chance for winning. For this 
reason, it is not unfair to blame the State (represented by the Federal, State and Municipal Governments) 
for a large part of the current judicial crisis. Using an economic concept, it can be said that the State 
“crowds out” judicial demand in the country: since it overuses the system, it pulls the price of judicial 
services  up  (actual  prices  and  opportunity  costs);  and  for  this  reason,  private  demand  is  inhibited. 
Although this comes as no surprise for anyone who is acquainted with the Brazilian Judiciary, it is rare to 
                                                 
1   Quoted by the Strategic Planning Nucleus of the State of Maranhão Judiciary, in a “Best Practices Guide” (2009).    
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see discussions about the abuse by the State as one of the primary causes of the judicial problems. 
    Another factor comes to light based on the above analysis (again, using an economic term): the 
“adverse selection” in the demand of judicial services. It is very attractive for debtors to use judicial 
inefficiency simply in order to delay payments. Since procedural law allows anyone to appeal almost 
without restriction, and since slackness in courts is so high, lengthening the process by appealing multiple 
instances makes it possible to gain time. This is another unfortunate byproduct of judicial inefficiency: it 
attracts the bad users, and repels many who are in need of courts for protection of their genuine rights.  
    There is, at least, one additional explanation for inefficiency, which is not often mentioned. It is 
less  related  to  the  external  dimensions  of  courts,  and  more  related  to  internal  dimensions  of  their 
functioning.  
A Complementary Explanation: Poor Administrative Management, Lack of Leadership  
    The  Brazilian  public  sector  has  no  tradition  of  developing  professional  management. 
Managerial sciences have evolved quite satisfactorily, but there have been no spillover effects on the 
public sector. Moreover, public employees are covered by a specific set of laws, completely apart from 
ordinary labor laws applicable to workers in the private sector. As in other countries, laws for public 
employees allow much less flexibility for management to foster efficiency at the workplace. 
    The belief that poor management may be a primary factor causing the judicial crisis has gained 
more adherents, including top-level judges. Some experts even point to poor court management as the 
most serious problem in the Brazilian Judiciary. Sherwood (2007) shows that each court has a president 
who is responsible for its budget, purchase of material, information technology, hiring and training of 
staff, infrastructure maintenance and systems management. Yet, one must remember that, by law, every 
court president must be a judge. Thus, the author concludes that the judicial system in Brazil is managed 
by amateurs: almost every judge is, by definition, an amateur in management, since law school curricula 
do not include any managerial training. The law requiring judges to manage courts certainly is another 
sad  historical  inheritance:  since  Imperial  times,  judges  were  frequently  involved  with  administrative 
matters (Carvalho, 2003). The need to devote a large part of their scarce time to bureaucratic issues is 
another strong factor that contributes to high inefficiency in courts. Dakolias (1999) shows that Brazilian 
judges spend 65% of their working time involved with non-judicial, bureaucratic duties
2. 
    Staff members also suffer from the lack of professional managers. As a direct consequence, it is 
not hard to find typical principal-agent problems in court operations. There are very few leaders with 
ability  to  drive  human  resources  in  the  desired  direction.  Some  quantitative  research  confirms  this 
analysis: the Ministry of Justice (2007) found out that the main causes of inefficiency in some judicial 
offices were workers’ apathy and lack of managerial leadership.  
    What is needed to make the above discussion more complete is an objective evaluation of (in) 
efficiency in the Brazilian Judiciary. This is what we do next.  
 
                                                 
2   Corresponding numbers are 70% for Argentina and Peru, and 0% in Germany and Singapore.  
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3. Methodology and Data 
Evaluation of court efficiency will be carried out by employing Data Envelopment Analysis 
(DEA). DEA is one of the methods based on calculations of production frontiers; another one is the so-
called  Stochastic  Frontier  Analysis  (SFA).  Production  frontier  models  are  classified  into  different 
categories: statistical/non-statistical, stochastic/non-stochastic, parametric/non-parametric. SFA is based 
on statistic, stochastic and parametric models, while DEA models are based on non-parametric, linear 
programming optimization calculus
3.  
DEA differs to most parametric models in a significant manner, since it does not assume direct 
a priori knowledge of the production function. Yet, it is consistent with the principles of microeconomic 
theory of the firm, and includes most of its elements. The production possibility set, (T), is made up by 
feasible combinations of the vectors of inputs, (X), and outputs, (Y). Since Y is a function of X - Y(x) - 
and X is a function of Y - Y(x) - it turns out that, if Y is known for every x, and X is known for every y, 
then T is known indirectly. T’s frontier constitutes the production frontier, and indicates the objective 
basis of comparison for all Decision Making Units (DMUs). Efficient units are located on the frontier, 
while inefficient ones are within T, away from the frontier. In this sense, DEA provides measures of 
relative efficiency among different DMUs and these are based on an analysis of the inputs employed and 
the outputs produced by each unit. 
Important assumptions about T should be remembered from the microeconomic theory: 
(1) T, Y and X are convex sets: if (x, y), (x’, y’) ∈ T, α ∈ [0, 1] ⇒ α (x, y) + (1 - α)(x’, y’) ∈ T. Y and X 
are also bounded and closed. 
(2) A positive amount of inputs is necessary for the production of a positive amount of outputs: if y > 0, 
then x ≠ 0. Also, if x ≥ 0 => y ≥ 0.  
(3) It is possible to freely dispose outputs and inputs: if (x, y) ∈ T, x’ ≥ x => (x’, y) ∈ T; if (x, y) ∈ T, y’ ≤ 
y => (x, y’) ∈ T. It is also possible, under the weak version, that x’ = αx, and/or y’ = yα
-1 for α ≥ 1.  
(4) It is possible to proportionally resize the scale of any productive process in T: if (x, y) ∈ T => α(x, y) 
∈ T, for any α ≥ 0. 
Following Simar & Wilson (2001), one may recall Shephard (1970), who provides a distance 
function in outputs for an observed production possibility, (x, y), to the frontier of T:  
 
D(x, y) ≡ inf{θ |(x,θ
-1y) ∈ T},            (1) 
 
Details about the variables and their meanings will be discussed below.  For now, one needs only to attain 
to the fact that this distance shows the maximum feasible augmentation in y, an observed output vector, 
letting x constant. Calling each of the observed production possibility points a DMU, θ = D = 1 for 
efficient DMUs, and these ones are on the frontier of T; all others have θ = D < 1. DEA finds a linear 
                                                 
3   Traditional DEA models were mainly non-statistic, and non-stochastic. Yet, recent developments in the field include 
statistic and stochastic approaches. We will not employ these very advanced models in this paper.    
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combination of observed DMUs that employ, at most, as many inputs as the unit being evaluated, DMU0, 
but which produce a fraction of θ
-1 more of outputs than DMU0 does.  
We can also write expression (1) as a linear programming problem: 
 
[D(x,y)]
-1 = max{θ | θy ≤ λY, x ≥ Xλ}            (2) 
 
DEA has been widely used in efficiency analysis across many different areas, especially in the 
public services sector. Among its advantages is the ability to analyze not-for-profit organizations, and the 
possibility  to  analyze  efficiency  of  multi-product  firms.  DEA  presents  many  advantages  over  other 
traditional methods in economics for the analysis of courts. First, there is little confidence that we can 
accurately model the production function in the Judiciary. It is even harder to convincingly assume that 
we  know  the  distribution  of  the  error  term.  This  makes  parametric  methods,  including  Stochastic 
Frontiers, not well-suited for an adequate analysis. Moreover, some studies (e.g., Souza, 2001) suggest 
that DEA has several advantages when dealing with non traditional sectors: random impacts have less 
influence over the final results, multi-product production functions are more frequent, input and output 
market  prices  are  hard  to  stipulate,  and  hypotheses  of  profit  maximization  and  cost  minimization 
decisions are not adequate for the analysis. In such circumstances – which seem to be the case of the 
Judiciary – DEA is the most appropriate methodology. For this reason, it is not surprising that DEA is the 
most commonly used method for measuring court efficiency around the world. We carried out a brief 
survey in the literature and found out that most of the papers that attempt to measure court efficiency 
employ DEA or Free Disposal Hull (FDH), a more sophisticated version of DEA
4.  
Defining Efficiency 
 Before we start measuring efficiency, we must be very clear about what we are measuring. In 
other words, what do we exactly mean by court efficiency? In part 2 of this paper, we referred several 
times to efficiency as a synonym of speediness; and this idea matches the common understanding of an 
“efficient  court”.  However,  the  economic  definition  of  efficiency  is  usually  that  of  Pareto:  one  firm 
(court) is considered efficient if it is unable to produce more outputs (adjudications) without employing 
more  of  any  inputs  (judges,  staff,  computers,  etc.).  The  DEA  methodology  is  in  accordance  to  this 
concept, since it is based on the microeconomic theory, and this can be seen by the fact that it mainly 
compares the usages of inputs and outputs across different units. One can also see that the economic 
definition does not differ from that one which relates to speediness: a speedy court is certainly more able 
to deliver more adjudications than a slower one. Thus, the economic concept is the one adopted here: a 
court will be considered efficient if and only if it is able to produce as many judicial decisions as possible, 
given a certain amount of judges, staff and other capital goods. Furthermore, as we will explain more into 
details later on, it is not enough for a particular court to produce the greatest amount of decisions in the 
sample. It is also necessary that it does so in relative terms: if a State Court is faced with a high level of 
                                                 
4   The result of this (short) survey is available upon request.  
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demand, for it to be considered efficient it must produce a proportionally higher amount of decisions, as 
compared to less-demanded courts. It is possible to understand this point by taking a potential litigant’s 
perspective: if a court is efficient, the litigant will have a speedy service, no matter if he/she lives in a 
state with very busy or very “idle” courts. 
The Output Oriented, Constant Returns to Scale CCR Model 
The adequate choice of a DEA model is of crucial importance because it has significant impacts 
over the results that one might derive. Differences of the many models developed in DEA literature may 
be summarized into: assumptions of returns to scale, input and/or output orientations, and, for the variable 
returns  to  scale  assumption,  radial  or  non-radial  metrics.  As  Charnes  et  al  (1994)  point  out,  the 
envelopment frontier is identical for all choices, but the projection point, i.e., the basis for comparison for 
an inefficient unit, is different for each model
5.  
The  DEA  model  employed  here  is  the  one  originally  developed  by  Charnes,  Cooper  and 
Rhodes, CCR (1978), which assumes constant returns to scale. Lewin et al (1982) and Schneider (2005) 
assume constant returns to scale for American Criminal Courts and German Labor Court, respectively. 
Pedraja-Chaparro and Salinas-Jimenez (1996) did the same for Spanish courts, after regressing efficiency 
scores on size and finding no statistical significance in the coefficients. The results obtained by Dalton & 
Singer (2009) and by Kittelsen & Førsund (1992) seem to indicate one same factor: only courts that are 
smaller in size and handle less complex cases are those likely to show increasing returns to scale. This is 
not observed in larger courts. Moreover, very few papers found evidence of decreasing returns to scale in 
courts, the one example being Beenstock & Haitovsky (2004) in Israel. For all these reasons, we assume 
the hypothesis of constant return to scales.  
Even if we had no indications from the literature to corroborate the assumption of returns to 
scale, we could infer it from knowing the actual structure and functioning of Brazilian courts. As briefly 
discussed in the “Overview and Diagnosis” section, there are some characteristics that may give us hints 
about the “judicial production process”. Judges and staff are legally required to follow a long series of 
steps for each specific case; they need to devote particular time for each one that arrives to the courts, and 
this time is not changed with the increase or decrease in the number of suits. Another characteristic that 
further impedes gains of scale in Brazilian courts is the infrequent use of jurisprudence, as opposed to 
common law countries. This means that judges rarely use the precedents for similar cases; instead, they 
would go through the case from the beginning, analyzing all its details. This is especially true for lower 
degree courts. For all these reasons, it seems reasonable to assume a model of constant returns to scale.  
DEA employed here is, furthermore, output oriented: it analyses by how much a court can 
increase the level of output, while maintaining constant the level of inputs. The alternative would be an 
input oriented DEA, which in turn analyses how much input a court could save, while maintaining a 
                                                 
5   DEA models include: the CCR (adopted in this paper), the BBC, the Additive, and the Multiplicative, among others. 
Charnes et al (1994) provide a good introduction to most of the basic DEA models, and discuss the implications when 
employing each of them.  
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constant level of output. Choosing between these two orientations is a matter of evaluating the power of 
decision that managers have over each variable. Not only the literature more usually employs the output-
oriented model, but also, the particular characteristics of the Brazilian Judiciary suggest that those who 
run the courts have little leverage on the level of inputs, since this is determined by laws. Thus, it seems 
that court managers have more potential impact on the decision of the level of outputs produced. 




φ,λ,s+,s−z0 = φ +εs
+ +εs
−







                        (3) 
 
Because this is an output-oriented model, instead of θ, which is a number between 0 and 1, we 
need a φ = θ
-1 increase in the amount of outputs to transform inefficient DMU0 into an efficient unit.  
If a specific DMU has an optimal value of z0, it is an efficient unit and it lies on the production 
frontier. An  inefficient  DMU,  (X0,  Y0),  may  become  efficient  if  it  is  projected  to  an  efficient  point, 
€ 
( ˆ  X  0, ˆ  Y  0),  on  the  frontier. This  efficient  point  may  not  be  empirically  observable. Yet,  in  such  cases, 
€ 
( ˆ  X  0, ˆ  Y  0) will be a convex combination of observable efficient DMUs. In other words, 
€ 
ˆ  X  0 = Σλk
*Xk and 
€ 




* ≥ 0,∀k is a vector of empirically observed weights attached to each X k and Y k of 
efficient units. The maximum increase in output may be achieved by means of multiplying φ to inefficient 
DMU outputs vectors Y0. Variables, s
+ and s
-, tell us that, in order to be efficient, a DMU also needs to 
have slacks all equal to zero. s
- measures the excessive amount of inputs employed by an inefficient unit, 
and s
+ the lack in the quantity of outputs produced by this same unit. The difference between the slack 
variables and φ is that, the latter is a proportional measure applied to the entire vector. In the output-
oriented case, φ indicates the proportional increase applied to all outputs of an inefficient unit. As Charnes 
et  al  (1994)  show,  “[this  increase]  is  applied  simultaneously  to  all  [outputs]  and  results  in  a  radial 
movement  toward  the  envelopment  surface”  (p.  32).  Instead,  s
+  is  a  vector  containing  independent 
measures to be applied to each individual output. Mathematically, s
+ and s
- are vectors, while φ is a scalar. 
Finally, ε is a non-Archimedean constant, or, a non-real number. Its presence guarantees that all variables 
are restricted to positive values (Cooper et al 2007).   
DEA solves maximization problem (3) for each of the observed DMUs. This is a great contrast 
to what is done in regression models, where a single “average” plan is considered.     
Data and Variables 
    Data for DEA analysis comes from the annual reports, “Justiça em Números”, issued by CNJ, 
the National Council of Justice. These reports cover Federal Justice Courts, State Courts, and Labor 
Courts. In this paper, we will focus only on State Courts data, and for the latest year, 2008. All numbers 
are provided by each State Court and include a long list of measures, such as: expenditures, number of  
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judges, number of employees, number of computers, new filings, backlog, appeals, and adjudications. 
    Two outputs were used: the number of adjudications in first and second-degree courts. Each of 
these was divided by a measure of “workload”, which in turn, consists of the number of filings in the 
current year added to the number of pending cases from the previous year. For instance, the second-
degree court in the State of Pernambuco adjudicated 12,341 cases in 2008. There, 22,453 new cases were 
filed in the same year, and 50,561 cases were pending on December 31, 2007. Therefore, the ratio of 
adjudications controlled by workload was 0.1690. In order to avoid inaccuracy of results due to the small 
numbers, we multiplied the above ratio by 100
6. Thus, for DEA calculation, Pernambuco’s output was 
entered  as  16.90.  Controlling  output  by  workload  is  crucial,  given  the  high  disparities  of  judicial 
movement across different states.  
    Three inputs were used: the number of judges, the number of auxiliary staff, and the number of 
computers. All of these variables were weighted. The former two were weighted by “workload” (as we 
did for outputs) in order to consider the relative amounts, since the absolute value is determined by law, 
which is usually very inflexible to the oscillations in workload. One should compare the relative amount 
of inputs employed by one state with the relative amount employed by another state. Again, in order to 
avoid small numbers, the resulting ratio was multiplied by 100,000. Thus, one could read the “weighted 
number of judges” as the number of judges available for every 100,000 cases that need to be adjudicated. 
The number of available computers was weighted by the number of internal users
7.   
 
4. Results and Discussions 
    Table 1 shows summary of descriptive statistics for outputs, and Table 2, for inputs: 
 












Mean  50791  465631  43.55  44.00 
Minimum  1184  15306  10.79  8.81 
Maximum  438307  3005626  72.06  133.69 





                                                 
6   DEA procedures seem to be sensitive to the presence of extremely small numbers. 
7   Computer users include judges, internal and outsourced employees, interns and other hired workers who “regularly use 
computers in the year considered”. All variable definitions were provided in the report appendices.  
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Mean  52.79  583.82  0.87 
Minimum  11.27  128.82  0.11 
Maximum  201.32  1654.97  1.16 
Median  45.86  492.45  0.91 
 
With regards to outputs, there is clearly a great heterogeneity across the different State Courts in 
the  country,  but  in  general  they  do  have  heavy  workloads.  If  one  recalls  the  manner  in  which  the 
“weighted output” variables were constructed, it becomes evident that Brazilian courts are not being able 
to cope with the increase in workload. Only one state, Rio de Janeiro (in the first degree courts), has 
weighted output equal or higher than 100 (in first-degree courts).  An important observation should be 
made here. It is possible that several adjudications have to occur before a lawsuit is finally solved. This is 
particularly true for the case of Brazilian procedural law, which, as discussed above, is cumbersome and 
offers multiple possibilities of appeals. Therefore, a perfectly efficient court, that clears all the pending 
cases from the previous year and also the new filings in the current year, would have a number of 
adjudications larger than the simple summation of the number of pending cases and the number of new 
filings.       
As for inputs, one special point deserves attention. With regards to the number of computers, 
recently, the CNJ launched a national campaign in order to disseminate the usage of computers and 
electronic files all over the country. Some State Courts have explicit goals of making 100% of its records 
available in electronic format in a few years, while others have already achieved this goal. 
Table 3 shows efficiency measures for year 2008:  
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Table 3: Efficiency Measures – State Courts 2008 
DMU (State Court)  Efficiency (θ) 
Rio de Janeiro  1.000 
Rio Grande do Sul   1.000 
Piauí  1.000 
Rio Grande do Norte  0.935 
Goiás   0.887 
Paraná   0.887 
Mato Grosso  0.886 
São Paulo  0.878 
Alagoas  0.792 
Rondônia  0.777 
Acre  0.764 
Paraíba   0.726 
Sergipe  0.717 
Maranhão   0.688 
Minas Gerais  0.681 
Santa Catarina  0.613 
Distrito Federal  0.552 
Mato Grosso do Sul  0.549 
Amapá  0.532 
Ceará  0.497 
Amazonas  0.491 
Tocantins  0.462 
Pernambuco  0.436 
Espírito Santo  0.422 
Pará  0.395 
Bahia  0.349 
Roraima  0.344 
 
The average efficiency in Brazilian State Courts is 0.676; however, if one discards the perfectly efficient 
units, average efficiency falls to 0.636. The numbers above show that courts from the States of Rio de 
Janeiro, Rio Grande do Sul and Piauí are on the production frontier, i.e., they are relatively the most 
efficient units in the country. All other States could improve the level of their outputs without recurring to 
increases in the amount of inputs employed. 
    We would like to emphasize, again, that DEA provides relative measures of efficiency instead 
of absolute ones. Therefore, we are comparing Brazilian State Courts between themselves, and not to an  
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idealized  measure  of  exogenously  given,  absolute  level  of  efficiency.  As  discussed  before,  relative 
measures may have advantages of not needing an a priori knowledge of the sector’s production function, 
and also of indicating the potential benchmarking cases for actual policy implementation.    
Peer Group and “Genuine Efficient Units”  
    The  next  table  shows  a  “test”  for  the  efficiency  measures  presented  above.  DEA  uses  the 
number of times an efficient DMU is peer for inefficient ones as a way to test robustness of results. One 
might recall from the theoretical discussion that, for each inefficient unit, it is possible to derive an 
efficient  projection  onto  the  production  frontier.  This  projection  point  is  a  convex  combination  of 
empirically observed efficient units. For this reason, the more a DMU appears in the comparison group of 
inefficient units, the more it is likely to be “truly” efficient.   
 
Table 4: Frequency in which efficient units appear as peer for inefficient ones 
Efficient Unit  N. of times it is peer  
(total = 24) 
Rio de Janeiro  23 
Rio Grande do Sul  22 
Piauí  1 
 
As explained by Cooper et al (2007), if an efficient DMU does not appear as peer for others, or appears 
few times, we should be cautious about the result. It might be the case that this unit has an unusual 
production function and/or that it has different input weights, as compared to others. Pedraja-Chaparro & 
Salinas-Jiménez  (1996)  consider  only  those  who  appear  many  times  in  the  peer  group  as  “genuine 
efficient” units. With this in mind, and according to the above results, we can say very confidently that 
Rio de Janeiro and Rio Grande do Sul are efficient units among Brazilian State Courts.  
 The case of Piauí, on the other hand, deserves much caution. Not only it is peer to only one state 
– Amapá, which also has Rio de Janeiro as its peer – but also because of particular problems with the data 
of the piauiense Court, about which we discuss next. One should be skeptical about this efficiency result. 
Reliability of Data and Outcomes 
DEA results may be obtained by calculations based on a very few input/output measurements. 
Thus, many authors warn that data accuracy is crucial (Charnes et al, 1994). The national collection of 
judicial statistics in Brazilian courts started in 2003, one year before the creation of CNJ. A brief look 
over the data shows that the quality at the beginning of the time series was questionable. For many states, 
there were several blanks, making them useless for a temporal panel. Clearly, the quality of data has been 
improving greatly throughout the years, especially because State Courts are now legally mandated to 
gather and send all statistics to CNJ, which by its turn, has punitive power over all judicial members. Yet, 
six years later, data is still not perfect. Two states were not 100% compliant in our sample, for the 
variables we employed: Mato Grosso and Piauí. There were only three gaps in this dataset (a great 
improvement  if  compared  to  previous  years),  but  two  of  them  were  related  to  the  number  of  
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adjudications, which are not trivial gaps
8. Thus, the efficiency measures calculated by DEA for these two 
State Courts have questionable reliability.  
Even for some states without data gaps, we still have confidence issues and are unsure whether 
the numbers provided do really “make sense”. To check this, one would need to go to the raw data and 
analyze it in details; furthermore, a comparison of the statistics in a temporal panel would be needed. For 
some previous research, we carried out this very exercise, with some gloomy results. Hopefully, with the 
improvement of recent data collection the problems that we found before are now less frequent. We leave 
the continuation of this task for future works.  
Actual Outputs vs. Target Outputs, Actual Inputs vs. Target Inputs 
Next table presents valuable information for policy recommendations. It shows, for a selected 
group of DMUs, the empirically observed level of outputs, as well as the level they should be, if the unit 
were  an  efficient  one
9.  In  other  words,  the  table  offers  the projected  points  lying  on  the  production 
frontier, for the observed DMUs. By definition, efficient units are already on the frontier and, therefore, 
constitute their own projection points, so they have target output values equal to the observed output 
values. Calculations of the slacks in the table come from efficiency measures (θ) and output slacks (s
+).    
Table 5: Outputs – Observed vs. Targets (selected units) 
  
Observed 

















Rio de Janeiro  72.064  0.000  0.0%  133.695  0.000  0.0%  1.000 
Maranhão  56.294  0.000  0.0%  41.147  77.292  187.8%  0.688 
Distrito Federal  56.674  0.000  0.0%  92.177  5.760  6.2%  0.552 
Ceará  10.789  43.002  398.6%  26.990  0.000  0.0%  0.497 
Roraima  28.265  0.000  0.0%  35.299  23.104  65.5%  0.344 
 
Again, recalling from the theoretical discussion, the results above show that it is possible to improve 
output levels without increasing the amount of inputs employed. The direct comparison is not of an 
inefficient unit to an efficient one, but of an inefficient unit to a “fictional” (but feasible) projection of 
itself, located on the production frontier
10.  
    DEA also provides us with the following table
9: 
 
                                                 
8     We filled these gaps with the average values of the two previous years. 
9     The complete version of this table is available upon request. 
10     It comes as no surprise that all inefficient units in our analysis have one observed output equal to the target output 
(percentage difference equals to zero). If both outputs were different to the target, it would be possible to make a radial 




Table 6: Inputs – Observed vs. Targets (selected units) 
 
 As one can see from Table 6, although we have employed the output-oriented DEA model, it is 
still possible to get calculations for the input slacks
11. The numbers in the table indicate that inefficient 
units not only produce outputs below the target level, but also employ inputs above the target level. Here, 
the slacks directly come from the calculations of s
-. Since only the efficient units have all input slacks 
equal to zero, Table 6 (when filled with data from all states) indicates that, in fact, all inefficient units are 
employing  more  resources  than  they  need  to  become  efficient. This  result  weakens  considerably  the 
justifications of lack of resources as being one of the main results for court inefficiency.  
 
5. Preliminary evidence of correlation between court organization and efficiency 
As discussed in previous sections of this paper, one might suspect that the presence of good 
management is an important determinant of the level of efficiency in the courts. In a preliminary survey, 
we have found that, indeed, the State Courts of Rio de Janeiro and Rio Grande do Sul do have some 
common features. From their website, it was possible to get information about internal programs aimed at 
increasing efficiency and improving organizational climate. The website of Rio de Janeiro, for example, 
publishes productivity measures for each of its judges, which may be considered quite extraordinary, even 
for  international  standards.  The  State  Court,  which  a  2004  World  Bank  Report  considered  to  be  a 
benchmark in Brazil, searched for and got the ISO 9001:2000 certification, the well-known international 
standard for quality in services. The certification first came in December 2006. These initiatives, as well 
as others implemented by different efficiency top-performers, are positive novelties, especially if one 
considers the perverse Brazilian public sector tradition.  
    On the other hand, our preliminary results show that courts with very low performance are 
those  that,  at  first  glance,  seem  to  be  “lagging  behind”  in  terms  of  internal  organization  and  “user 
friendliness”. On their website it was not possible to find information about how resources are being 
allocated, or how much productive judges and/or local courts are. Moreover, there was no information 
                                                 


















Observed)  Efficiency  
Rio de Janeiro  45.856  0.000  0.0%  802.563  0.000  0.0%  1.000 
Maranhão  78.482  30.520  38.9%  814.556  0.000  0.0%  0.688 
Distrito Federal  60.341  0.000  0.0%  1038.403  12.191  1.2%  0.552 
Ceará  38.317  15.572  40.6%  287.274  0.000  0.0%  0.497 
Roraima  52.984  8.204  15.5%  738.745  0.000  0.0%  0.344  
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about objective strategic goals of any kind (such as, “x%” improvement in court delay in “y” years). 
Finally, there do not seem to be specific programs aimed at staff career development or work motivation. 
These do not seem to be priority points in their agenda at all.  
 With the purpose of evaluating internal organization in a more objective manner, we constructed 
a “quality of court organization index”. The aim of this index is not to offer a scientific proof of our 
arguments, but rather, a less judgmental indication of the importance of organization on efficiency. Five 
indicators were used to construct this index and they were based on Hammergren’s (2007) “proposed 
instrument for assessing judicial operation” (pp. 252-5). The five indicators evaluated were: 
1)  There  is  managerial  or  customers’  service  training  for  staff  and/or  judges  to  improve  their 
productivity at the workplace (training in legal issues did not count). 
2)  The court has a strategic, multi-year plan with well-defined goals and areas for improvement. 
3)  The  court  employs  alternative  methods  to  quickly  solve  disputes,  such  as  arbitration  and/or 
conciliation. It informs users about these services and offers guidance about how to access them
12.   
4)  Judges’ productivity or efficiency performance results’ are publicized. 
5)  The court publishes its recent statistics on productivity and efficiency results. 
 
In this first stage of the project, information used to construct the index was entirely obtained 
from the State Courts’ websites. Thus, transparency comes above all indicators. Although this might raise 
some problems in our assessment, one could justify it for the need of judicial transparency; as judicial 
reform experts indicate, transparency is an element that cannot be ignored by any Judiciary in modern 
democracies
13.  
All indicators carry the same weight. Therefore, if this index is a good measure of quality of 
court organization, a very organized court must get an index with a full-score of 5. Then, we considered 
all State Courts that achieved scores of 4 or 5 to be the “top performers” with regards to organizational 
quality; those who achieved scores of 0 or 1 are considered “poor performers”, and all the remaining, are 
“average performers”. On the other hand, we considered “DEA top performers” to be all units with scores 
higher than 0.70; those under 0.5 were considered “DEA low performers”, and the remaining units are 
“DEA average performers”. Our hypothesis is that performance measured by the “quality of organization 
index” is related to efficiency performance measured by DEA. If we take all “DEA average performers” 
and consider a “perfect correlation” when they either present top, average or poor performance in the 
                                                 
12   CNJ, the National Council of Justice, has been stimulating all State Courts to disseminate conciliation procedures. In 
recent years, it has organized the “National Week of Conciliation” involving several State Courts. The indicator here was only 
considered to yield a “yes” if there were other non-CNJ mandated campaigns to disseminate the use of conciliation and other 
alternative dispute resolutions mechanisms.    
13   Four websites were completely unavailable or contained serious problems for access during the period of our research: 
Espírito Santo, Mato Grosso do Sul, Rondônia and Roraima; for the reasons just described above, their indicators where all 
considered to be equal to zero. Further details about the construction and measures of this index are available upon request.   
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“quality of organization index”, we would have a correlation of 81.5%. If we were to be more cautious, 
and disregard those cases of “average organization performers” who got either “top DEA” or “poor DEA” 
scores, we would have 15 (out of 27) “right matches”, i.e., a correlation of 56% between the “quality of 
court organization index” and DEA-efficiency results. There seems to be evidence that the quality of 
internal organization does have some relation to court efficiency.   
Again,  this  index  has  no  solid  scientific  basis  yet,  and  was  constructed  based  solely  on 
information gathered from the websites. However, despite these weaknesses, we believe this index offers 
some indications of the correlation between internal organization and efficiency performance. A second 
stage  of  this  research  should  include  a  more  in-deep  analysis  of  the  differences  in  the  internal 
organization of efficient courts as compared to inefficient ones. We hope to be able to go beyond data 
published on the internet, and, hopefully, we will be able to reach more objective conclusions about this 
correlation measurement in future works.  
 
6. Preliminary Conclusions and Directions for Future Research 
    Given the above results, what might one conclude? First, the lack of material resources cannot 
be mainly blamed for the low levels of efficiency in Brazilian courts. DEA shows that at least 24 State 
Courts could further improve their level of efficiency, even if inputs – i.e., human and material resources 
– were kept constant. In fact, most of them should decrease the amount of inputs employed. DEA also 
allows us to analyze the target level for outputs and inputs of inefficient units.  
    Second, as one can infer from the “Diagnosis” section of this paper, and as evidences indicate, 
the  ability  of  good  managers  to  organize  the  internal  structure  of  courts,  including  the  allocation  of 
material resources and motivation of staff, seems to have a very important role that the literature and 
common-sense have never realized. Further research is necessary to confirm these preliminary results in a 
more scientifically based manner. Yet, we are confident that the role of management on court efficiency is 
much more important than it has traditionally assumed to be. 
    As  this  is  such  a  novel  topic  among  Brazilian  studies  (not  in  the  content,  but  in  the 
methodology), there is still much to be done, which is quite stimulating. In recent years, there have been 
very  fast  and  very  sophisticated  advancements  in  DEA  models,  which  include  stochastic  elements, 
including  the  construction  of  confidence  intervals,  probabilistic  variables,  etc.  Incorporating  some  of 
these new elements might probably offer even more precise measurements for the reality of the Brazilian 
courts. A long road rests ahead all of us who are interested in this important and challenging topic.      
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